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Basic Rules 
The initial read of Respondent's appeal brief left little doubt that 
a review of a number of basic ground rules in a Rille 56, LR.C.P., proceeding 
was needed, especially when a jury trial is requested. To wit: 
Summary judgment under Idaho Rille of Civil Procedure 56( c) 
is appropriate if the evidence before the court discloses no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Respondent's Brief failed to discuss how its Complaint's Count One 
brought under L C. Section 55-901, et. seq. met this burden in light 
ofLC. Section 55-908's clear and unambiguous language requiring factual 
proof of actual fraudulent intent. 
When a motion for summary judgment is made in a case that woilld 
otherwise be tried to a jury, the court must draw all reasonable inferences 
supported by the evidence in favor of the party resisting the motion. See, 
Mastrangelo v. Sandstrom, Inc., 137 Idaho 844, 846,55 P.3d 298,300 (2002); 
G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 
(1991); Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 
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156 (CtApp.1994); Burgess Farms v. New Hampshire Ins. Group, 108 Idaho 
831,835,702 P.2d 869,873 (Ct.App.1985). 
Summary judgment is impermissible when there is a conflict in the 
evidence respecting material issues of fact. See, Wait v. Leavell Cattle Inc., 
136 Idaho 792,798,41 P.3d 220,226 (2001); First Sec. Bank of Idaho, N.A. 
v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787, 792, 964 P.2d 654,659 (1998); Hines v. Hines, 129 
Idaho 847, 853, 934 P.2d 20, 26 (1997); Straley v. Idaho Nuclear Corp., 
94 Idaho 917,918-19,500 P.2d 218,219-20 (1972). Respondent's Brief failed 
to discuss or resolve the conflicts between the Complaint's Count One 
(I.C. Section 55-913(2)'S listedfactors and the Respondent's custom indices of 
fraud) with I.C. Section 55-908's determination of actual fraudulent intent when 
the sole answering defendant requested a jury trial. 
When a jury trial has been requested, even if no direct conflict in the 
evidence exists, a summary judgment motion must be denied if the evidence 
is such that conflicting inferences may be drawn there from, and if 
reasonable people might reach different conclusions. See, Olsen v. 
JA. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706,720,791 P.2d 1285,1299 (1990). Once again, 
Respondent's Brief fundamentally failed to explain how under I.C. Section 
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55-901, et. seq. its Complaint's Count One negated this basic principle for this 
answering Defendant who requested a jury trial. See specifically, I.C. Section 
55-908. 
In light of Respondent's explanations and arguments, or the lack 
thereof, the issues on appeal can now be refined to reflect the settled facts and 
the applicable law. 
1) Under I.C. Section 55-908, on the Complaint's Count One (the 
fraudulent transfer claim), the District Court erred by 
granting summary judgment against the sole answering defendant 
based, wholly or in part, upon the default of the corporate 
co-defendant. 
In its Brief beginning at Page 19, Respondent attempts to recast the 
Complaint's Count One as something other than a sole claim under I.C. Section 
55-901, et. seq. by advancing the competing fictions of "real loaned funds" and 
the newly invented "alternative claim for fraudulent transfer" theory. What utter 
nonsense in light of the structure and language used by Plaintiffs counsel in the 
Complaint! 
First, Respondent argues that only Sterling Mortgage had "standing" 
to defend the mortgage and its lien rights. Ordinarily, this might have been a 
good argument, but in this case it is directly contrary to the factual evidence 
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attached to the Complaint itself. On Page 2, first paragraph, of the February 28, 
2008 Real Estate Mortgage between this Appellant and Sterling Mortgage, the 
following unambiguous language is found: 
"Mortgagor represents to and covenants with Mortgagee and Mortgagee's 
successors, administrators and assigns, that Mortgagor will WARRANT and 
defend said real estate and premises against the lawful claims of all persons." 
See, Record, Page 29. 
Contrary to Respondent's way of thinking, it is clear from the terms of the 
governing mortgage document that either party to the Real Estate Mortgage 
had the right, if not the obligation, to defend the transaction and Lot 74. 
In addition to arguing against the evidence attached to one's own 
complaint, Respondent also dropped the ball by failing to address the relevant 
conflict oflaw principles with regard to the validity of the Promissory Note and 
Real Estate Mortgage. Clearly, both documents contained a choice oflaw 
provision calling for the application of Montana law. See, Record Pages 30 and 
106. Equally clear is the rather logical argument that if the Promissory Note is 
valid under Montana law (and it is), then "real loaned funds" must have been 
involved in the transaction. Surely, not even the Respondent would believe that a 
construction project can be accomplished without real or actual payments to 
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contractors and subcontractors alike. The construction monies had to come from 
somewhere. And yes, they had to be "real funds." 
Respondent continued to expand on its fictional argument by 
unreasonably narrowing the holding in Frow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. 552 (1872), 
with a newly invented notion of "independent theories of liability." See, 
Respondent's Brief, Page 21,jirst line. Considering the structure and language 
used in the Respondent's Complaint, especially in the Prayer for Relief, 
Respondent's logic and argument is utter nonsense. As presented on Page 14 
of my opening brief, federal courts have extended the rule in Frow to apply to 
defendants who are similarly situated, even if not jointly and severally liable. 
See, Gulf Coast Fans, Inc. v. Midwest Elecs. Imps., Inc., 740 F. 2nd 1499,1512 
(11th Gir. 1984). With regard to this case, these holdings are clearly implemented 
and embodied by Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P. 
From an advocate's viewpoint, Respondent would have been far better 
served by reconciling the inconsistencies between the structure and language of 
its Complaint with the burden and form of proof required under I.C. Section 
55-901, et. seq. This is especially true with regard to I.C. Section 55-908 and an 
answering defendant's (mortgagor's) jury demand. Respondent's argument 
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imputing Sterling Mortgage's default to this answering Defendant based upon a 
newly hatched "real loaned funds" theory is illogical and diametrically opposed 
to not only the Frow rationale, but Rule 56, I.R.C.P., as well. After all, how 
under Rule 56, I.R.C.P., and I.C. Section 55-908 was summary judgment properly 
granted as a matter of law when the specific controlling statute clearly and 
unambiguously provides that actual fraudulent intent is a question of fact? 
If Respondent intended to use a Rule 56 summary judgment proceeding in the 
course of this case, its Complaint should have been structured and prosecuted in 
a far different manner. In light of Respondent's case management choices, the 
District Court's arguably implausible September 29, 2011 one minute fifty second 
(00:01:50) decision making process orally granting summary judgment was 
clearly and plainly an abuse of discretion and clear err. See, Record, Page 301, 
and Pages 238-239, 243-249. 
2) Under Rule 54, I.R.C.P., the District Court erred by 
awarding Plaintiffs counsel its unpaid, unearned or incurred 
attorney fees and costs. 
Respondent's argument regarding unpaid or incurred attorney fees is a 
bit confusing. Beginning on the bottom of Page 22 of its Brief, Respondent 
argues: 
"The other type of awardable costs, discretionary costs, is not subject to 
the "actually paid" requirement; discretionary costs only have to be 
"reasonably incurred." Attorney fees clearly are not costs as a matter of 
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right and therefore are not subject to the "actually paid" requirement in 
that rule. Attorney fees are only related to costs for purposes of making a 
joint request for fees and cost: ... " 
On the one hand, Respondent's argument appears to agree with Appellant 
that attorney fees are "deemed costs" under Rule S4(e)(s) and therefore subject 
to Rule S4(d). On the other hand, Respondent's argument attempts to divorce 
attorney fees from the concept of "deemed costs" using a "joint request" theory. 
A strange idea, especially when considered in light of Rule 16(a), LA.R. 
As I argued in my Opening Brief, Rule S4(e)(s), LR.C.P., provides that 
"attorney fees, when allowable by statute or contract, shall be deemed as 
costs in an action .... " See, RECD Construction Company, Inc. v. J-U-R 
Engineers, Inc . ... , __ Idaho __ , 233 P.3d 1216 (2010). See, specifically, 
Footnote 1 on Page 6 of the Opinion. Based upon the plain wording and a fair 
reading of Rule S4(e)(s), attorney fees are indeed costs in an action. The 
only issue seems to be whether they are subject to Rule S4(d)(1)(C) or 
Rule 54(d)(1)(D), costs as a matter of right or discretionary costs. Costs as a 
matter of right have to be "actually paid," or practically speaking, have to be paid 
under a binding obligation, in order to be properly awarded. Discretionary costs, 
on the other hand, are subject to a reasonably "incurred" test. 
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With all due respect, Respondent's conclusion that attorney fees 
are not "costs as a matter of right" was a bit hasty and not very well reasoned. 
Realistically, when a district court makes the decision to award attorney fees 
under I.C. Section 12-121, the award for all intent and purposes becomes a 
certainty, and arguably a "matter of right." The only true discretionary element 
is the amount. 
For the sake of a shortened reply argument, let's assume that the 
Respondent is correct and that only Rule 54(d)(1)(D),s "reasonably incurred" 
requirement has to be met. In this case, trouble still abounds. 
Merriam-Webster defines the word "incur" as a transitive verb as: 
to become liable or subject to. In a business or accounting sense, the word 
"incurred" is commonly defined as: 
A word used by accountants to communicate that an expense has 
occurred and needs to be recognized on the income statement even 
though no payment was made. The second part of the necessary entry 
will be a credit to a liability account. 
The problems in this case date back to my early Rule 17(a), I.R.C.P., 
Motion to discover, or flesh out, the real party in interest. See, Record, 
Pages 137-145. To date, Respondent's counsel has not produced any ofthe 
named Plaintiffs board of directors' minutes authorizing this lawsuit. 
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Nor has Respondent supplied the court with a client letter of engagement 
demonstrating any Board authorization, or outlining the scope and terms of the 
representation in this lawsuit. Under Rule 54(d)(1)(D), a named party simply 
can not "incur" an expense if that party is not liable to pay that expense. 
Perhaps this is the principal reason why the Island Woods Homeowners 
Association has for the past few years not stated or recognized the true or correct 
amount of Respondent's attorney fees in the annual financial statements to its 
members. IWHA's lack of proper reporting for accounting purposes is certainly 
consistent with Respondent counsel's representation to the District Court to the 
effect that: "Counsel for Plaintiff has yet to be paid for any of the work that it has 
performed over the last few years, ... " See, Appellant's Opening Brief, Page 23. 
Realistically, in a normal attorney-client relationship, the client is not 
given "years" to pay its attorney for representation based upon hourly billings. 
Yet, on Page 23 of its Brief, Respondent counsel represents to this Court, 
without citation to any part of the record, that: 
"IWHA could never have afforded legal representation in this 
matter if the rules required IWHA to pay its $100,000 legal bill 
prior to seeking reimbursement from McGimpsey." 
To this off-the-record, unsupported statement, I reply -- balderdash! 
According to the official Board minutes released to the resident members on a 
periodic basis, IWHA's cash flow was/is good and the Association has an ample 
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cash reserve account. Respondent's counsel's unsupported remarks should be 
stricken or disregarded. 
The true nature of this case is now blindingly obvious. The initial litigation 
over the alleged failure to landscape or install a mailbox was so feeble that the 
only goal of any of this was the generation of attorney fees for the Plaintiffs 
lawyers. However, without a proper Island Woods Board authorization, the 
present suit is nothing more than a law firm litigating pro set for its fees. To this 
end, this Court and the Court of Appeals have left little doubt that pro se litigants, 
including attorneys litigating pro se, are not entitled to an award of attorney fees. 
See, Swanson & Setzke, Chtd. v. Henning, 116 Idaho 199, 774 P.2d 909 (Ct. App. 
1989). See also, Barbee v. WMA Sec., Inc., 143 Idaho 391, 397, 146 P·3d 657, 
663 (2006); Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 377, 973 P.2d 142, 148 
(1999). 
Before I leave the riveting subject of attorney fees, I am compelled to 
respond to Respondent's Footnote 2 on Page 22 of its Brief. Yes, I am indeed 
challenging the reasonableness of the unearned fees awarded under the 
March 30, 2012 fee and cost request. That is precisely why Pages 24-25 were 
included in my Opening Brief. Frankly, I am unaware of any rule of 
jurisprudence or case law that stands for the proposition that "unearned" fees 
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can be legally, or for that matter ethically, paid. The equation that I invoked 
earlier bears repeating: No law cited + no arguments made + no 
authority provided = NO WORK = NO PAY! 
3) The District Court erred under I.C. Section 11-102 by 
allowing the sheriffs sale to go forward based upon a 
demonstrated mathematically and financially defective 
writ of execution. 
On Page 24 of its Brief, Respondent begins by informing this Court that 
with regard to its defective Amended Writ of Execution: 
"The District Court rejected this argument without much discussion." 
Correctly speaking, the District Court, in a well worn and repetitive pattern of 
oral decision making, rejected my argument without any discussion -- period. 
Respondent then goes on to make the following clearly misleading 
statements: 
"First, McGimpsey has utterly failed to show what mathematical 
errors are contained in the Amended Writ. McGimpsey made the 
mathematical errors." 
Respondent's statements are not only misleading, they are also 
disingenuous. On Page 26, last paragraph, of my Opening Brief, I plainly 
and clearly wrote the following: 
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"On February 13, 2012, I filed a motion under Rule 62, LR.C.P. asking the 
District Court to quash the Amended Writ and Levy against Lot 74 based 
upon demonstrated mathematical and financial defects. Record, Pages 349-351. 
A brief in support of the Rule 62 Motion was filed on February 27, 2012, prior to 
hearing. Record, Pages 364-371. Attached to the brief as Exhibit A 
(Record, Page 371) was an Excel spreadsheet that clearly 
demonstrated to the District Court the mathematical and financial 
errors in the Amended Writ." Emphasis supplied. 
If I correctly understood the balance of Respondent's argument 
defending its mathematically defective Amended Writ, there appears to be little, 
if any, concern, desire or need to comply with the "actually due" language of 
LC. Section 11-102. And, to my ever growing surprise, at least according to 
Respondent's argument, an unwritten statutory exception for "minor 
mathematical errors" in a writ of execution, now exists. Subject, of course, 
to a newly invented post-sale corrective proceeding. 
Respondent's argument that a mathematically incorrect writ can be used 
to effect a valid execution sale is appalling. What purpose then does LC. Section 
11-102 serve if a judgment creditor can quite unintelligently miscalculate the 
amount of its judgments and proceed to an execution sale anyway? Unless the 
words "actually due" mean something other than mathematically correct 
amounts due onjudgment(s), the letter ofLC. Section 11-102 should be followed. 
After all, what could be any easier than getting the math right? The District 
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Court erred by not requiring the Amended Writ to be corrected prior to sale. 
Especially, an Amended Writ that asked for more money than the original 
judgments called for. In mathematical terms, we are back to a simple equation: 
Bad Math = Statutorily Defective Writ & Levy = Invalid Sheriffs Sale. 
4) Under Rule 56, LR.C.P., the District Court erred by 
orally dismissing this answering Defendant's three 
Counterclaims without requiring any proof or evidence 
of the Plaintiffs affirmative defenses of issue and claims 
preclusion. 
In almost every case, an issue arises that lays bare both judicial defects 
and the politics in play. For this case, Issue #4 was it. Issue #4 embodies the sad 
reality that when a District Court is intent on a course of action - it will happen. 
No matter what! 
On Page 27 of its Brief, Respondent makes the following statements: 
"McGimpsey instead cites inapplicable cases discussing how the initial 
appellant brief must contain all issues on appeal. The standard, of course, is 
different at the district court level where issues do not have to be resolved all 
at once and failure to challenge the counterclaims during the initial motion for 
summary judgment would not have prevented a subsequent challenge on 
summary judgment." 
Respondent's thinking is plainly at odds with this Court's analysis and 
reasoning in Beatriz Nava, et. a1. v. Christian R. Rivas- Del Toro et. aI., 
__ Idaho ___ , 264 P.3d 960 (2011). In Nava, Justice Eismann wrote: 
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"Typically, parties moving for summary judgment merely state the relief or order 
sought in the motion, and then state with particularity the grounds for the motion in 
a supporting memorandum. If a ground for summary judgment is not stated with 
particularity in the moving papers, the opposing party need not address that ground. 
"For purposes of summary judgment, the moving party bears the initial burden of 
proving the absence of material fact issues. Only then does the burden shift to the 
non-moving party to come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue 
of material fact." Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv., LLC, 147 Idaho 
737,746,215 P.3d 457, 466 (2009) (citation omitted)." 
It is readily apparent that Respondent clings to the mistaken belief that 
its July 14, 2011 Clarification pleading, which by some drafting magic has now 
become a "Clarification brief', fulfilled the requirement for pleading with 
particularity. Well, here's a news flash. The Clarification pleading may be a lot of 
things, but the one thing it is not is a legal brief. It contains no cogent argument 
and no discernable cite to statute, authority or precedent. In reality, it is nothing 
more than a "mention in passing" for the affirmative defenses of issue and claims 
preclusion. See, Record, Pages 189-191. 
As this Court held in Oregon Mutual Insurance Company v. Farm Bureau 
Mutual Insurance Company of Idaho, 148 Idaho 47, 218 P.3rd 391 (2009): 
"Res judicata is an affirmative defense and the party asserting 
it must prove all of the essential elements by a preponderance 
of the evidence." 
See also, Ticor Title Co. v. Sanion, 144 Idaho 119,122, 157P.3rd 613,616 (2007)· 
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How then was a proper dismissal of any of this Defendant's three 
Counterclaims even remotely possible under Rule 56, I.R.C.P., given that the 
Plaintiff offered absolutely no cogent argument or cites to statute, authority or 
precedent in its: 1) initial Rule 56 Motion; 2) its supporting Amended 
Memorandum; 3) its Clarification pleading; 4) its reply brief; or 5) at hearing? 
The answer is quite simply that in order to pull off this bit of judicial 
alchemy, the moving party needed help. And, in this case that help was omni 
present in the form of a very activist jurist who was more than able and willing to 
fill in the Plaintiffs drafting potholes. A very activist jurist who, I might add, 
was also quite willing to reward Plaintiffs counsel with unearned attorney fees. 
Plaintiffs counsel in the run up to summary judgment had every 
opportunity to step back and correct their pleading and practice approach. 
Especially after reading this Appellant's Brief in opposition. Instead, they elected 
to roll the dice on a drive-by or mention-in-passing approach for their affirmative 
defenses leaving it up to the District Court to fill in the gaps. Well, it worked. 
So far, Plaintiff and its counsel have been able to prosecute this case via tweets 
by merely introducing a general legal theory in cryptic form, and then letting the 
District Court do the rest. Perhaps Respondent is correct that this Court's 
I.A.R Rule 35(a)(6) standards don't apply to proceedings in a district court. 
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But, rightly or wrongly, that is what this appeal is largely about. Moving on. 
5) Under Rules 15, 54(c) and 56, LR.C.P., the District Court erred 
by allowing the Plaintiff, sans motion or order, to add a claim 
for a Fourth Judgment post-default to the Complaint's Count Two 
-- the declaratory judgment action. 
First, we have the law: 
Rule 54(c), LR.C.P., Demand for judgment, states in applicable part 
that: 
"A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from or 
exceed in amount that prayed for in the demand for judgment." 
Then, we have Respondent's excuse for not following the law: 
"IWHA inadvertently forgot to include the Fourth Judgment in 
the Complaint." Respondent's Brief, Page 28, last paragraph, first 
sentence. 
Plaintiffs Prayer for Relief, Record Page 25, clearly sought a declaratory 
judgment for just three (3) judgments. Yet, post-default, the summary judgment 
included four (4) judgments with the Fourth Judgment adding approximately 
fifty percent (50%) to the Plaintiffs initial money demand. How was this 
amazing judicial maneuver possible without resorting to a timely and proper 
Rule 15, LR.C.P., amendment you ask? The answer here is the same as that 
discussed above with regard to dismissal of the three Counterclaims. Friends 
with black robes in high places are good to have. They can make arguments 
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when you haven't. They can deem your opponent's arguments frivolous when 
they aren't. They can also make summary judgment even more summary by 
turning a blind eye to those pesky procedural rules like Rule 15 and Rule 17, 
LR.C.P. In general, they can make life really, really easy. And, the best news --
you get paid for doing nothing. 
Okay, enough of the sour grapes. But, darn it, it's hard to watch such 
blatant disregard for plainly written rules and statutes and not want to jump to 
your feet and yell-- foul. Or, in legal parlance -- I object! When did 
"inadvertence" become a substitute or excuse for proper jurisprudence? 
I certainly can't fault Respondent's counsel for perfecting the art of the half 
argument. Or, in some instances, the non-argument. Win by any means 
seems to be in vogue these days. 
To my way of thinking, the fault lies squarely with a District Court 
who from day one expressed a complete and utter dislike for this case and was 
more than willing to move it as fast as possible by any means off the docket. 
On this issue, the District Court clearly erred by allowing the Plaintiff to add the 
Fourth Judgment post-default without a proper Rule 15 amendment during the 
summary judgment process. In short, the District Court's error poisoned the case 
for all of the parties, defaulted or otherwise. 
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6) Under Rule 56, LR.C.P., based upon the evidence and 
exhibits, the District Court erred by constructively 
reclassifying the ownership interests of the two individual 
Defendants' homestead from tenant-in-common separate 
property interests to a quasi community property interest. 
Respondent advanced a two prong argument on this issue: standing and 
Idaho's community property law. I am going to begin with the easier of the two 
prongs: standing. 
Distilled to its essence, Respondent argues that despite being a 
tenant-in-common owner of Lot 74 that this answering Defendant is precluded 
from raising a legal argument defending the ownership status of Lot 74 because 
of my wife's default. Respondent's misunderstanding is a clear departure from 
general real estate law and the structure and scope of its Complaint. 
Respondent's counsel has for some strange reason failed to grasp, or even 
recognize, the in rem nature of Lot 74, and the role that it plays in the defense of 
each of the property owners' interests and the Property itself. Lot 74 is owned by 
two people as undivided tenants-in-common. Is it all that difficult to understand 
that both owners have an independent right to defend a claim against the 
Property? And, is it all that difficult to understand that when one of those owners 
exercises their individual right to defend, that despite the overlapping benefit to 
the passive owner, the defending owner is in actuality representing his/her own 
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interests? From an analytical perspective, this answering Defendant's defense of 
Lot 74 in this multiple party case is nothing more than a fundamental application 
of the Frow holding. In summary, there is no legitimate issue of standing to be 
considered. 
The crux of this issue is the dustup over the unsupported classification of 
the ownership of Lot 74 as community property. And, of course, the classification 
of the judgments against this answering Defendant as community debt despite 
overwhelming evidence to the contrary. 
parts: 
On Page 33 of its Brief, Respondent's position can be distilled to three 
1) That it is irrelevant "that the McGimpseys were initially married in 
a non-community property state or that they were residing in a 
non-community property state when they purchased the Property"; 
2) That Lot 74's ownership classification is not determined by 
the McGimpseys' decision to own the property as undivided 
tenants-in-common; and 
3) The ownership classification or status of real property under Idaho law 
is determined by the source of the funds used to purchase the 
property. 
Respondent's attempt to change the reality of this situation reminds me of the old 
saying that: "Even the most able of counsel can be defeated by the facts or the 
law." 
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First, let's start with the basics: The Complaint itself. Aside from the 
single use of the words "community interest" in Paragraph 78 of the Complaint, 
there is absolutely no mention of community property at issue. Record, Page 23. 
There is no count, no claim, and certainly no mention of community anything 
in the Complaint's Prayer for Relief. In fact, in Paragraph 8 of the Complaint's 
Prayer for Relief, it was only the sale of the separate property interest of 
Mr. McGimpsey that was requested. Record, Page 26. Procedurally, the sleight 
of hand conversion of Lot 74 to a community asset didn't occur until after the 
District Court's oral grant of summary judgment on September 29, 2011. 
As discussed at length above, considering Rule 54(c)'s rather plain and 
unambiguous constraints on post-default relief, the classification of Lot 74 
as community property was a truly amazing piece of legal fiction. 
Rule 54(c) notwithstanding, the Achilles heel of Respondent's logic lies in 
the misplaced reliance on the "source of funds" rule to determine Lot 74's status. 
Yes, it is indeed true that the McGimpseys were married in Montana, a common 
law state, in 1993. It is equally true that they were full time residents of Montana 
in January 2001 when Lot 74 was purchased. And, it is most certainly true that 
by virtue of B.W., Inc.'s corporate warranty deed that they took title to Lot 74 
as undivided tenants-in-common. See, Record, Page 214. 
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So, how exactly do funds of residents residing in a common law state like 
Montana magically become community funds in Idaho, thereby giving rise to a 
community asset? In a common law state, even funds held in a joint account, 
are considered to be held in separate property interests. Surely, those funds 
don't lose their separate property character when they are used to purchase real 
property in a community property state. Thus, contrary to Respondent's way 
of thinking, it is indeed relevant that the McGimpseys were married in a 
non-community property state, and that they were residing in a non-community 
property state when they purchased Lot 74. In a common law state, like 
Montana, community funds or community property simply don't exist. 
Just saying the words -- community property or community debt --
doesn't make it so. You can say or chant the word -- community -- a hundred 
times, maybe even a thousand times, but that doesn't change the classification of 
property or debt if the evidence is to the contrary. In this case, the District Court 
was not presented with a single fact or piece of conflicting evidence that 
supported Lot 74's ownership status as a community asset, or that Mr. 
McGimpsey's judgments were community debts. The Respondent created these 
fictions. And, the District Court, in its haste to clear the docket, bought in to 
them. Legally and procedurally, it was clear error then, and it's clearly error now. 
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In addition to properly classifying the ownership of property prior to 
execution, a judgment creditor also has a duty to properly structure the sheriffs 
sale. This then leads to the last two issues on appeal: 
7) The District Court did indeed err by allowing the sheriffs 
sale of Lot 74 to go forward without requiring the Plaintiff to 
comply with the execution process governing homesteads set 
forth in I.C. Section 55-1101, et. seq. 
8) A valid execution sale can not be made against a homestead 
owned by a husband Gudgment debtor) and wife (non-
judgment debtor) as undivided tenants-in-common without 
a pre-sale appraisal and a determination of the tenants' 
respective ownership interests? 
Respondent's argument on these last two issues comes across as 
begrudgingly gratuitous and to be frank, insulting. Considering that homesteads 
are a special class of property with statutes specifically designed to give valuation 
protection to homesteaders, it is hardly appropriate to refer to recently updated 
Idaho statutes as "antiquated," and in the next breath dismiss their application as 
one of mere discretion for a judgment creditor. Respondent's roll-of-the-dice 
approach to Lot 74's homestead valuation demonstrates an unbelievable 
misunderstanding of the law's purpose. Especially, in a situation where the 
property is owned as undivided tenants-in-common where one owner is a 
judgment debtor and the other not. 
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On Page 38 of its Brief, Respondent clearly and without qualification 
admits that the Property (Lot 74) was "sold for a reduced price" at the March 27, 
2012 sheriffs sale, but then goes on to offer six speculative reasons for the 
reduction. Seriously? This admission against interest falls into the same 
category and importance as the admission that the named Plaintiff hasn't paid its 
attorneys for years. To be fair, let's add one more cogent reason as to why Lot 74 
was sold at a reduced price. A reason that was completely disregarded by the 
District Court in the motions challenging the sales validity. That reason is: 
(7) The Plaintiffs failure to set a proper minimum bid when 
selling an undivided tenant-in-common owned property. 
Monetarily, Reason #7 is the only one that has any direct correlation or 
mathematical influence on the sales price. In a financial sense, Respondent's 
other six reasons are just pure, unadulterated fluff incapable of being monetized. 
Respondent argues that even if a pre-sale appraisal was mandated, the 
failure to show prejudice bars relief. Normally, I would question the rationale 
behind this line of reasoning as pure nonsense. But, in this case I am reminded 
that this is the same Respondent that believes that it is okay to add relief to a 
complaint post-default, add affirmative defenses post-filing to a summary 
judgment proceeding, and proceed to a sheriffs sale on a mathematically 
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defective writ. This is also the same Respondent that has three transparent 
mistakes on its appeal Briefs cover page. How then, can there be any realistic 
expectation that this same Respondent understood the simple algebra involved 
in setting a proper minimum bid for a tenant-in-common owned homestead 
where one tenant was a judgment debtor and the other not? 
All told, for those who still believe that the written law serves a somewhat 
useful purpose, isn't it rather silly to entertain any argument as to who has the 
duty of appraisal for a homestead in light of Idaho Code Title 55, Chapters 10 and 
11? Based upon the plain statutory language, it is abundantly clear that this duty 
initially falls squarely on the judgment creditor. 
And, as far as prejudice involving a sheriffs sales price is concerned, 
Respondent has apparently forgotten that all of Lot 74's owners had an intangible 
right to a fair sale in a public forum populated by willing independent buyers. 
In practice, the forced sale of a tenant-in-common owned homestead 
should be a relatively simple three part process: 1) Properly classify the 
property's status; 2) Properly determine the respective parties ownership 
interests; and 3) Properly structure and conduct the sale. Plaintiff-Respondent 
failed on all three counts. Correspondingly, the District Court erred by its failure 
Appellant, Philip P. McGimpsey's 28 
Reply Brief 
to supervise and rein in the Plaintiffs utter misunderstanding and disregard for 
the law. 
Attorney Fees and Costs on Appeal 
Turning now to the usual and expected topic of attorney fees and costs, 
Respondent has requested such under I.C. Section 12-121 and I.A.R. 41(a) based 
upon the notion that "none of the eight legal issues on appeal have any merit." 
In addition, Respondent's counsel gratuitously included an ad hominem invective 
on Page 40, Footnote 3 of its Brief in a not so subtle attempt to color the Court's 
impression of this Appellant's past life. 
Personally and professionally, I have always viewed an opponent's 
ad hominem attacks as a sign of weakness. When a lawyer resorts to such tactics 
in a legal brief you can bet with some certainty that it is an attempt to cover up 
either pleading and practice mistakes, or play to political theatre. Regardless, 
the dignity of the law is tainted and the process perverted. 
The monotonous structure of Respondent's Brief coupled with a reliance 
on I.C. Section 12-121 to request fees raises a somewhat interesting question: 
When does the repetitive, incessant or unnecessary use of the word "frivolous" 
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become frivolous conduct? Under I.C. Section 12-123(1)(b), Conduct is frivolous 
if: 1) it serves merely to harass or maliciously injure a party; or 2) it is not 
supported by fact or a good faith argument in law. Thus, it seems entirely 
possible that a repetitive, incessant or unnecessary use of the word "frivolous" 
can be frivolous conduct. The same could also be said for ad hominem attacks. 
Considering the nature and severity of Plaintiffs procedural and 
substantive missteps in the structure and conduct of this case, it is all but 
statistically impossible that none of the eight legal issues raised on appeal would 
have any merit. Quite the opposite. All eight issues, jointly and severally, raise 
legitimate issues of fact and/or law. Thus, this Court's holdings in Turner v. 
Willis, 119 Idaho 1023, 812 P.2d 737 (1991) apply and would clearly be a bar to 
any award of Respondent's requested attorney fees and costs. 
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CONCLUSION 
From the ashes of a feeble controversy involving a few trees, grass and 
a lowly mailbox, rises the possibility that some truly good precedent will be born 
in the state of Idaho from this case. Although the facts of this case may be 
somewhat unique, the lessons to be learned can be universally applied. 
By way of example, a claim for a fraudulent transfer brought under I.C. 
Section 55-901, et. seq., coupled with this Defendant's jury demand, is an issue 
of first impression in a Rule 56 summary judgment proceeding. Then, there is 
the issue of first impression for unpaid, unearned or incurred attorney fees as 
"deemed costs" under Rule 54. And the list goes on. 
Each of the eight issues on appeal present either a fact or some piece of 
law that is a unique take on the applicable statutes or procedural rules. The 
Plaintiffs many mistakes, coupled with the District Court's willingness to bless 
those mistakes, gives this Court more than enough raw clay to work with. 
Although the list of issues is long and the mistakes many, the scales of 
justice can be rebalanced by simply applying the law as written to the facts at 
hand. There is no good or sufficient need to resort to fictions or nonessential 
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mud slinging to correct the errors in this case file. Good legal work and a steady, 
fair judicial hand should get the job done in short order. 
DATED this ___ day of July, 2012. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Philip P. cGimpsey 
Appellant-Defendant 
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